Introduction 

This series of essays is dedicated to reading Soren Kierkegaard through the philosophy of William James. The intention is not to compare two thinkers in the usual academic fashion, nor to catalogue similarities and divergences between them. That sort of exercise rarely produces anything philosophically useful. Rather, the aim is to use James as an interpretative instrument through which several of Kierkegaard’s central categories: truth, subjectivity, selfhood, repetition, anxiety, and ethical existence—can be clarified and rendered more concrete. 

Kierkegaard’s philosophy repeatedly returns to a single difficulty: the problem of what it means for a truth to become real within the life of an existing individual. For him, the decisive issue is not whether a proposition is objectively correct but whether it has been appropriated in such a way that it becomes operative within existence itself. Hence his formulation that and “objective uncertainty, held fast through appropriation with the most passionate inwardness, is the truth, the highest truth attainable for an existing individual” (CUP, p182). 

The point here is not that truth is produced by the individual, nor that objective knowledge is irrelevant. Mathematical propositions, historical facts, and empirical observations remain valid regardless of who holds them. Kierkegaard’s concern lies elsewhere. A belief may be correct and yet remain existentially inert if it never passes into the life of the person who holds it. The difficulty therefore concerns the relation between truth and existence. 

William James approaches this problem from a different direction but arrives at a closely related insight. In Pragmatism, he rejects the idea that truth is something inert which thought simply mirrors. Instead, he insists that ideas become true within the course of experience, where “truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events” (P, p106). 

This statement is frequently misunderstood as a denial of reality. James is not suggesting that belief arbitrarily creates the world. Rather, he is emphasising that ideas must be verified within the concrete movement of life. Truth is not merely possessed but realised through the role it plays in guiding action and organising experience. He expresses the same point elsewhere when he writes that the “knower is not simply a mirror floating with no foot-hold anywhere, and passively reflecting an order that he comes upon and finds simply existing. The knower is an actor, and co-efficient of the truth” (P, p110). 

What emerges from these remarks is a shared refusal of the notion that truth is something detached from the life of the individual who holds it. In both cases, truth is inseparable from the conditions under which it is lived. 

Reading Kierkegaard through James therefore proves philosophically illuminating. Kierkegaard insists that truth must be appropriated with inwardness and passion. James provides a vocabulary for understanding how beliefs become effective within experience through habit, action, and verification. Between them emerges a picture in which truth is neither a static correspondence nor a private sentiment, but something that must be enacted within the ongoing formation of a life. The problem thus shifts from knowledge to becoming. Kierkegaard formulates this difficulty with the assertion that the “self is a relation which relates itself to itself” (SUD, p13). 

The remark indicates that the self is not a fixed substance but an activity. Selfhood is a dynamic relation that must continually be established and maintained. One does not simply possess a self in the manner one possesses an object. The self must be achieved. 

James approaches the same issue from the standpoint of psychology. In The Principles of Psychology, he argues that conscious life is not static, but a continuous process organised through attention, effort, and habit. Ideas which are acted upon leave traces within experience, gradually shaping character and conduct. 

Taken together, these insights suggest that philosophy must concern itself less with abstract systems and more with the manner in which individuals come to inhabit their beliefs. The question is no longer simply what is true, but how truth becomes operative within existence. 

The discussion that follows therefore has seven areas of concern: 

1. First, the relation between truth, objectivity, and subjectivity.  

2. Second, the nature of the self as a process of becoming rather than a fixed substance. 

3. Third, the role of repetition and habit in the formation of character. 

4. Fourth, the significance of anxiety as the moment in which new possibilities become visible. 

5. Fifth, the role of attention and inwardness in shaping experience. 

6. Sixth, the rejection of ethical systems which attempt to derive life from abstract principles. 

7. Seventh, the question of whether selfhood is formed in isolation or through relation with others. 

The purpose of these essays is therefore not to assimilate Kierkegaard to pragmatism, nor to read James as a covert existentialist. Rather, the intention is to explore what becomes visible when the two thinkers are allowed to illuminate one another. 

Kierkegaard provides a rigorous account of the difficulties involved in becoming a self. James provides an account of the experiential processes through which such becoming may occur. Between them emerges a conception of truth that must be appropriated, tested, and lived in experience. 

PART ONE 

Truth and the Existing Individual 

Kierkegaard’s philosophy repeatedly returns to a single difficulty: the problem of what it means for a truth to become real within the life of an existing individual. The issue is not whether a proposition is objectively correct. Mathematical statements, historical facts, and empirical observations remain valid regardless of who holds them. The difficulty lies elsewhere. A proposition may be true and yet remain existentially inert if it never passes into the life of the person who affirms it. 

Kierkegaard captures this difficulty in a famous passage from Concluding Unscientific Postscript where he states that an “objective uncertainty, held fast through appropriation with the most passionate inwardness, is the truth, the highest truth attainable for an existing individual” (CUP, p182). 

This remark is frequently misunderstood as a declaration of subjectivism. But Kierkegaard’s claim is more precise than that. He is not suggesting that truth is created by the subject, nor that objective knowledge is irrelevant. Rather, he is drawing attention to the difference between knowing something and existing in relation to it. 

One may possess correct information without being transformed by it. A person may understand ethical principles perfectly well and yet fail entirely to live according to them. In such a case the knowledge exists as information but not as truth in the existential sense. The decisive question therefore becomes not merely what is true, but how the individual relates to what is true. Kierkegaard makes this point explicitly when he writes that the “objective accent falls on what is said, the subjective accent on how it is said” (CUP, p199). 

The distinction is decisive. Objective reflection seeks to determine the content of truth. Subjective reflection concerns the manner in which that truth is appropriated within existence. The difference lies not in the proposition itself but in the mode of life of the individual who holds it. 

This is why Kierkegaard repeatedly insists that truth, for an existing individual, cannot be reduced to detached contemplation. It must be appropriated with passion and inwardness. 

 James and the Verification of Truth in Experience 

William James approaches this same difficulty from a different direction. Where Kierkegaard emphasises inward appropriation, James emphasises the role of experience in determining the meaning and validity of belief. He rejects the idea that truth is something inert which thought simply mirrors. Instead, he insists that ideas become true within the course of experience. 

James is not suggesting that belief arbitrarily creates reality. Rather, he is emphasising that ideas must prove themselves within the practical movement of life. Truth is verified through the consequences of belief. 

The implication is that truth cannot be separated from the activity of the individual who seeks it. Beliefs organise perception, guide action, and gradually become confirmed or disconfirmed within the flow of experience. Thus, James shifts the discussion of truth away from static representation and towards verification within life. 

Truth as Appropriation 

Kierkegaard emphasises the inward seriousness required for a truth to become real within existence. James emphasises the experiential processes through which beliefs become effective in guiding life. The two approaches are not identical, but they converge upon a shared insight. Truth then, is not merely possessed but must be appropriated. 

Kierkegaard’s emphasis on inward passion can therefore be read alongside James’s account of experiential verification. A belief becomes real within a life when it directs attention, shapes action, and withstands the resistance of experience.  James describes this process in characteristically concrete terms when he states that “he ‘true’… is only the expedient in the way of our thinking” (P, p106). 

The statement is often misread as crude utilitarianism. But James’s meaning is subtler. Truth is what proves itself capable of organising experience in a coherent and fruitful manner. A belief becomes true insofar as it enables the individual to enter into satisfactory relations with other parts of experience. 

When read alongside Kierkegaard, this account of truth acquires an existential dimension. A truth that remains purely theoretical demands nothing of the individual. Existential truth, by contrast, requires the individual to live within uncertainty while maintaining fidelity to what has been appropriated. 

Truth and the Formation of the Self 

This movement from knowledge to existence leads directly to Kierkegaard’s account of selfhood. For him, the self is not a substance but a task. Selfhood is something that must continually be achieved through the way the individual relates to his own existence. 

James’s psychology provides a complementary insight. In The Principles of Psychology, he emphasises the role of attention and habit in shaping character. Ideas which are repeatedly acted upon gradually become incorporated into the structure of the self. Thus, the process through which beliefs become true is inseparable from the process through which a self is formed. As such, one does not merely discover truths but becomes the kind of person capable of living them. 

PART TWO 

Selfhood as Becoming 

For Kierkegaard, truth and subjectivity are inseparable. Truth becomes real only for an individual who is capable of appropriating it, and this immediately raises the further question of what it means to become such an individual in the first place. 

The definition is deliberately paradoxical. Kierkegaard is rejecting the idea that the self is a substance or a fixed entity. Instead, the self is a dynamic relation. It is something that must continually be established and maintained through the way the individual relates to his own existence. 

This relational structure immediately introduces instability. Because the self is not given once and for all, it must be continually achieved. One does not simply possess a self in the manner one possesses an object. One must become a self. Kierkegaard therefore distinguishes between merely existing and existing as a self. The latter requires a conscious relation to one’s own possibilities and limitations. This is what he means with the assertion that “the self is not something that one simply is, but something that one must become” (SUD, p43). Selfhood is therefore not an ontological fact but an existential task. 

This task arises from the peculiar structure of human existence. The individual stands between possibility and necessity, freedom and limitation, imagination and actuality. The self emerges from the tension between these elements. 

When this relation fails to establish itself properly, Kierkegaard speaks of despair. Despair is not merely an emotional condition but a structural failure in the formation of the self. It arises when the individual either refuses to become himself or attempts to become himself without acknowledging the conditions of his existence. 

Thus, selfhood is never simply given. It must be achieved through the ongoing effort of relating oneself to oneself. 

James and the Malleability of Character 

William James approaches the problem of selfhood from a very different direction. Where Kierkegaard writes as a religious thinker concerned with the structure of existence, James approaches the matter through psychology. Yet the two converge upon a strikingly similar insight: the self is not static but malleable. 

In The Principles of Psychology, James repeatedly emphasises the role of habit in the formation of character. Human behaviour, he argues, gradually stabilises through repeated patterns of action, with habit described as the “enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent” (PP, p121). 

At first blush this remark appears purely sociological. But James immediately extends the point to the formation of the individual. Habits do not merely stabilise social life; they shape the structure of the self. Ideas that are repeatedly acted upon gradually leave traces within the nervous system and the patterns of behaviour that follow from it. Over time these patterns become character. James therefore insists that “we are spinning our own fates, good or evil, and never to be undone. (PP, p127). 

The significance of this claim is that the self is not a fixed entity hidden somewhere behind experience. Rather, it emerges through the cumulative effects of action, attention, and habit. Where Kierkegaard speaks of the self as a relation that must establish itself, James describes the concrete processes through which such establishment occurs. The two perspectives converge on a shared point: selfhood is something that must be formed. 

Effort and the Direction of the Self 

James introduces an additional element into this account: the role of effort. 

Human beings are not merely passive recipients of habits imposed by circumstance. They possess the capacity to intervene in their own development by directing attention and effort towards particular actions. This is what he means by the assertion that the “effort of attention is thus the essential phenomenon of will” (PP, p562). 

Attention determines which aspects of experience are emphasised and which are ignored. By repeatedly directing attention toward certain actions or ideals, the individual gradually reorganises the structure of his own character. In this sense the will does not create the self instantaneously. Rather, it influences the gradual formation of habits that constitute the self over time. The self therefore emerges through a continuous interaction between action and reflection. 

Kierkegaard and the Difficulty of Becoming 

Where James emphasises the malleability of human character, with individuals shaping themselves through the habits they cultivate and the attention they direct toward particular goals; Kierkegaard, meanwhile, agrees that the self must be formed, but he places greater emphasis on the difficulty of this task. 

Human beings are constantly tempted to evade the responsibility of becoming themselves. One may lose oneself in social conformity, in distraction, or in abstract speculation. In each case the individual avoids the task of selfhood. This is why Kierkegaard insists that despair is so common. The individual frequently attempts either to escape from himself or to assert a self that is detached from the concrete conditions of existence. 

Selfhood therefore requires more than habit formation. It requires honesty, inwardness, and the courage to confront oneself. 

When Kierkegaard and James are read together, the formation of the self can be understood as a twofold process: 

1. Kierkegaard identifies the existential structure of the problem. The self is a relation that must establish itself. 

2. James explains the practical mechanisms through which such establishment occurs. Habits, attention, and effort gradually shape the character of the individual. 

Between them emerges a conception of selfhood that is neither static nor arbitrary.  

The self is not an essence waiting to be discovered. Nor is it a purely voluntary construction. Instead, it is something that must be continuously formed through the interaction between reflection, action, and experience. Selfhood is therefore a process of becoming. 

PART THREE 

The Problem of Continuity 

The question then arises how the formation of the self occurs through time. For if the self is not a fixed entity but something that must be continually achieved, then the philosophical problem immediately becomes one of continuity.  

Kierkegaard addresses this quandary through the concept of repetition, while James approaches the same difficulty through the psychological phenomenon of habit. Though they arise from very different intellectual contexts, the two concepts illuminate one another in a striking manner. 

Both thinkers are concerned with the same underlying difficulty: how an individual becomes something stable without becoming rigid, and how change can occur without dissolving the unity of the self. 

Kierkegaard and the Concept of Repetition 

Kierkegaard introduces the concept of repetition most explicitly in Repetition, where he describes it as a fundamental structure of existence: 

Repetition and recollection are the same movement, except in opposite directions; for what is recollected has been, is repeated backwards, whereas repetition properly so called is recollected forwards. (R, p131) 

In short, human life is often understood in terms of recollection. The past is remembered and reflected upon, and identity is constructed retrospectively from memory. Kierkegaard argues that this perspective is insufficient. Repetition, by contrast, is oriented toward the future. It is the movement through which the individual attempts to reappropriate life in the present. 

The distinction may appear abstract, but it describes something very concrete. An individual who merely recollects the past remains bound to it. Repetition, however, involves the attempt to take life up again in a new moment. Repetition therefore contains both continuity and renewal. The individual does not simply reproduce the past. Rather, he reclaims it through present action. 

This is what Kierkegaard means when he states that “repetition is the interest of metaphysics, and also the interest on which metaphysics comes to grief; repetition is the watchword in every ethical view” (R, p149). What is suggested here, is that human life cannot be understood as a single decisive act. One does not become oneself once and for all. Selfhood must be continually re-established. Repetition is therefore the temporal structure of becoming. 

James and the Structure of Habit 

Coming from the standpoint of psychology, James identifies habit as one of the most fundamental principles governing human behaviour. Through repeated actions, patterns of conduct gradually become stabilised within the nervous system. 

He then immediately extends this insight beyond the social sphere to the formation of character. Habits do not merely regulate behaviour; they shape the structure of the self. Repeated actions gradually become automatic. What initially requires effort becomes effortless through repetition. Every action leaves a trace. Over time these traces accumulate and solidify into stable patterns of behaviour. Habit thus provides the mechanism through which character develops. 

Repetition and Habit 

When Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition is read alongside James’s theory of habit, the relationship between the two becomes clearer. 

1. Kierkegaard describes the existential necessity of repetition.  

2. James explains the psychological process through which repetition operates. 

Repetition, in Kierkegaard’s sense, is the movement through which the individual attempts to reaffirm his existence. Habit, in James’s sense, is the mechanism through which repeated actions gradually reshape the individual’s character. 

The two therefore describe different aspects of the same phenomenon. 

1. Kierkegaard emphasises the difficulty of sustaining a commitment across time.  

2. James explains how repeated actions gradually make such commitments easier to maintain. 

This insight can be expressed more directly. What begins as a conscious decision gradually becomes incorporated into the structure of the self. Through repetition, a decision becomes a habit. 

The Role of Effort 

Despite the stabilising power of habit, James insists that human beings are not merely passive creatures shaped by their past actions. Individuals retain the capacity to intervene in their own development through the exertion of effort. 

Attention determines which elements of experience receive emphasis and which are neglected. By directing attention toward particular actions or ideals, the individual gradually alters the habits that shape his character. Thus, the formation of the self involves both continuity and intervention. Habits stabilise behaviour, but effort allows the individual to reshape those habits. 

The Difficulty of Repetition 

Kierkegaard’s analysis becomes particularly valuable at this point because he emphasises the difficulty involved in sustaining repetition. 

Human beings frequently attempt to escape from the responsibility of maintaining a commitment across time. Initial enthusiasm often fades. Resolutions dissolve under the pressure of circumstance. Repetition therefore requires perseverance. To repeat a commitment is not merely to reproduce an earlier decision. It is to renew that decision in the face of changing conditions. This is why Kierkegaard insists that repetition is not mechanical recurrence but existential renewal. The individual must continually take up the task of becoming himself. 

Becoming Through Time 

When Kierkegaard and James are read together, the temporal structure of selfhood becomes clearer: 

1. Kierkegaard identifies the existential movement through which the individual attempts to reaffirm himself. 

2.  James explains the psychological processes through which repeated actions gradually stabilise character. 

The two perspectives complement one another: 

1. Kierkegaard provides an account of the difficulty of becoming. 

2. James provides an account of the mechanics of becoming. 

Between them emerges a conception of selfhood as something that develops through repeated acts of appropriation. Thus, the self is not formed through a single decisive moment. It emerges gradually through the repetition of actions that shape character over time. 

PART FOUR 

Anxiety and the Structure of Possibility 

If repetition reveals the temporal structure through which the self is formed, the issue immediately arises as to what first disrupts the inertia of existence and makes transformation possible. Human beings do not ordinarily revise themselves without provocation. Life tends toward habit, stability, and repetition in the ordinary sense. Something must therefore disturb this equilibrium. 

Kierkegaard identifies this disturbance in the phenomenon of anxiety. In The Concept of Anxiety, he describes anxiety as a distinctive condition of human existence, it is “the dizziness of freedom” (CA, p61). 

The remark is deliberately paradoxical. Anxiety is not simply fear of something specific. Fear always has an object: one fears danger, loss, or pain. Anxiety, by contrast, arises from the awareness of possibility itself. 

Human beings possess the capacity to act in ways that are not predetermined by circumstance. This freedom introduces a peculiar instability into existence. When confronted with the openness of possibility, the individual experiences a kind of vertigo. 

Kierkegaard therefore insists that anxiety is inseparable from freedom, stating that “he whose eye happens to look down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy” (CA, p61). 

The abyss in question is not an external threat but the individual’s own capacity for choice. Anxiety therefore marks the moment at which the individual becomes aware that life is not fixed. The self is not merely given; it must be chosen. 

Anxiety and Selfhood 

This insight becomes clearer when anxiety is considered in relation to Kierkegaard’s definition of the self as a relation which relates itself to itself. Because the self must continually establish itself, it exists within a field of possibilities. Anxiety emerges precisely within this opening. 

It signals that the individual is not bound to a single predetermined path. At every moment the individual could act differently. This awareness generates a distinctive tension within consciousness. 

The individual confronts the possibility of acting in ways that will transform the course of life. The future remains open. Thus, anxiety is not merely a psychological disturbance. It is a structural feature of human existence. Without anxiety there would be no freedom, and without freedom there would be no possibility of becoming a self. 

James and the Experience of Risk 

William James does not develop a theory of anxiety comparable to Kierkegaard’s, yet his reflections on belief and decision illuminate the same phenomenon from a different perspective. 

In The Will to Believe, James argues that certain decisions cannot be postponed until complete certainty is available. Life frequently demands commitment in conditions of uncertainty. As he writes: 

Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds. (WTB, p11) 

The claim directly challenges the idea that belief must always wait for conclusive evidence. In many areas of life: religion, morality, and personal commitment—certainty is unattainable in advance. The individual must therefore choose without guarantees. 

James emphasises the existential character of this decision: 

To say that under such circumstances it is wrong always to yield to our passional nature is to say that our duty is to lose the good. (WTB, p28) 

The refusal to act until certainty arrives may itself be a decisive choice. In attempting to avoid risk, the individual may forfeit possibilities that only action can realise. James therefore insists that belief often precedes verification rather than following it. 

This insight resonates with Kierkegaard’s account of anxiety. Both thinkers recognise that the individual must sometimes act within uncertainty rather than waiting for it to disappear. 

Anxiety and Decision 

When Kierkegaard’s account of anxiety is read alongside James’s analysis of belief, a shared structure becomes visible. 

Anxiety marks the moment at which the individual becomes aware of possibility. James’s notion of the genuine option describes the situation in which the individual must decide among possibilities that cannot be resolved through purely intellectual means. In both cases, the individual stands at a threshold. 

The threshold separates two different modes of existence. On one side lies the inertia of habit and convention. On the other lies the possibility of transformation. Anxiety reveals this threshold and decision crosses it. Thus, anxiety is not merely a negative condition. It is the psychological manifestation of freedom itself. 

Courage and the Will 

James’s psychology adds an additional dimension to this account by emphasising the role of effort in sustaining decisions once they have been made. Freedom does not consist in arbitrary choice. Rather, it consists in the capacity to direct attention and sustain commitment in the face of competing impulses. 

Kierkegaard expresses a similar idea when he emphasises the importance of inward passion. The individual must maintain fidelity to a chosen path even when doubt and uncertainty remain. 

Anxiety therefore does not disappear once a decision has been made. Instead, it accompanies the individual throughout the process of becoming. The task is not to eliminate anxiety but to act despite it. 

Anxiety and the Possibility of Transformation 

The significance of anxiety therefore lies in its capacity to interrupt the inertia of habitual existence. 

Habit tends to stabilise behaviour. Individuals become accustomed to familiar patterns of thought and action. Without disturbance, these patterns persist indefinitely. Anxiety disrupts this equilibrium. By revealing the openness of possibility, it forces the individual to confront the question of how life should be lived. In this sense anxiety performs a paradoxical function. It destabilises the self in order to make transformation possible. 

Kierkegaard recognises this when he writes that anxiety is the condition in which freedom becomes visible. James recognises it when he insists that belief must sometimes be ventured before it can be verified. Both thinkers therefore suggest that the individual must risk uncertainty in order to become something new. 

PART FIVE 

Attention and the Structure of Experience 

Given that anxiety reveals the openness of possibility, the question that immediately follows is how the individual navigates that openness. Human life presents an overwhelming abundance of impressions, possibilities, and impulses. Without some principle of selection, experience would dissolve into chaos. 

William James addresses this problem through his analysis of attention. In The Principles of Psychology, he insists that consciousness is never a passive mirror of reality. Instead, it actively selects certain aspects of experience while ignoring others. As such: “My experience is what I agree to attend to” (PP, p402). 

Experience, then, is not simply given. It is structured through the direction of attention. What we attend to becomes prominent within consciousness, while what we ignore recedes into the background. 

James emphasises that attention therefore determines the organisation of life: 

Each of us literally chooses, by his ways of attending to things, what sort of universe he shall appear to himself to inhabit. (PP, p424) 

Attention does not create reality, but it determines which aspects of reality become meaningful within experience. The direction of attention therefore plays a decisive role in shaping the individual’s perception of the world. 

The Will and the Direction of Attention 

For James, attention is closely connected with the operation of the will. The will does not consist primarily in dramatic acts of decision but in the capacity to sustain attention upon a chosen object. The will manifests itself not in grand gestures but in the quiet persistence with which attention is maintained. 

When an individual directs attention toward a particular action or ideal, the repeated reinforcement of that attention gradually shapes behaviour. Over time, these patterns become habits that stabilise character. Thus, attention provides the bridge between momentary decisions and long-term formation. What one repeatedly attends to, one gradually becomes. 

Kierkegaard and Inwardness 

Kierkegaard approaches this same problem through the concept of inwardness. 

Where James analyses the psychological mechanics of attention, Kierkegaard emphasises the existential seriousness with which an individual relates to his own life. Inwardness refers to the depth of the individual’s commitment to what he recognises as true. 

In Concluding Unscientific Postscript, he writes: 

The thing is to find a truth which is true for me, to find the idea for which I can live and die. (CUP, p24) 

This statement is often misunderstood as an endorsement of subjectivism. But Kierkegaard’s point is not that truth varies from person to person. Rather, he is emphasising that truth becomes existentially meaningful only when it is appropriated with seriousness and passion. 

Inwardness therefore concerns the intensity of the individual’s relation to truth. A belief held superficially remains external to the individual. A belief appropriated with inwardness becomes a guiding principle of life. 

Passion and Commitment 

Kierkegaard frequently uses the language of passion to describe this inward relation to truth. 

Passion here does not refer to emotional volatility. Instead it denotes the intensity with which the individual commits himself to what he recognises as meaningful. Without such commitment, knowledge remains purely theoretical. Kierkegaard therefore insists that “truth is precisely the venture of choosing an objective uncertainty with the passion of the infinite.” (CUP, p204) 

The remark echoes the theme developed earlier in the discussion of anxiety. The individual cannot eliminate uncertainty before acting. Instead, he must maintain fidelity to a chosen path despite the absence of absolute guarantees. Passion therefore sustains commitment across time. 

Attention and Inwardness 

When Kierkegaard’s concept of inwardness is read alongside James’s analysis of attention, the relationship between the two becomes clear. 

1. James explains how the direction of attention shapes experience and gradually forms character.  

2. Kierkegaard emphasises the existential seriousness required to sustain that direction. 

Attention provides the mechanism, while inwardness provides the intensity. Together they describe the process through which individuals organise their lives around certain values and commitments. Without attention, commitments dissipate. Without inwardness, attention becomes trivial and scattered. As he writes:

The thing is to find a truth which is true for me, to find the idea for which I can live and die. (CUP, p24) 

This statement is often misunderstood as an endorsement of subjectivism. But Kierkegaard’s point is not that truth varies from person to person. Rather, he is emphasising that truth becomes existentially meaningful only when it is appropriated with seriousness and passion. 

Inwardness therefore concerns the intensity of the individual’s relation to truth. A belief held superficially remains external to the individual. A belief appropriated with inwardness becomes a guiding principle of life. 

Passion and Commitment 

Kierkegaard frequently uses the language of passion to describe this inward relation to truth. 

Passion here does not refer to emotional volatility. Instead it denotes the intensity with which the individual commits himself to what he recognises as meaningful. Without such commitment, knowledge remains purely theoretical. Kierkegaard therefore insists that “truth is precisely the venture of choosing an objective uncertainty with the passion of the infinite.” (CUP, p204) 

The remark echoes the theme developed earlier in the discussion of anxiety. The individual cannot eliminate uncertainty before acting. Instead, he must maintain fidelity to a chosen path despite the absence of absolute guarantees. Passion therefore sustains commitment across time. 

Attention and Inwardness 

When Kierkegaard’s concept of inwardness is read alongside James’s analysis of attention, the relationship between the two becomes clear. 

1. James explains how the direction of attention shapes experience and gradually forms character.  
2. Kierkegaard emphasises the existential seriousness required to sustain that direction. 

Attention provides the mechanism, while inwardness provides the intensity. Together they describe the process through which individuals organise their lives around certain values and commitments. Without attention, commitments dissipate. Without inwardness, attention becomes trivial and scattered. 

Action, the Formation of Character, and Direction of the Self

Both thinkers therefore insist that philosophy cannot remain purely theoretical. 

1. James emphasises that beliefs must be tested through action within the flow of experience.  

2. Kierkegaard insists that truth must be appropriated through concrete existence. 

This shared emphasis on action reflects a common suspicion toward purely speculative philosophy. Abstract reflection alone cannot transform life. 

The formation of the self occurs through the interaction between thought and action. 

1. James describes this process in practical terms. Ideas which are repeatedly acted upon gradually become incorporated into the structure of the self through habit. 

2. Kierkegaard emphasises the existential dimension of this process. The individual must continually reaffirm the commitments that define his life. 

Thus, action becomes the medium through which truth enters existence. 

The relationship between attention, inwardness, and action reveals something fundamental about human existence. As such, the self is not merely shaped by external circumstances. Individuals participate actively in the formation of their own character. By directing attention toward particular ideals, sustaining commitment through inward passion, and acting upon those commitments in the world, individuals gradually shape the structure of their own lives. The direction of the self therefore depends upon the direction of attention. What an individual consistently attends to becomes the organising principle of existence. 

PART SIX 

The Limits of Ethical Systems 

If attention and inwardness describe the manner in which individuals organise their lives around particular commitments, the discussion that follows concerns the nature of ethical life itself. Philosophy has often attempted to resolve this question by constructing systematic moral frameworks intended to determine the correct course of action in all circumstances. 

Both Kierkegaard and William James exhibit a deep suspicion toward this ambition. 

For Kierkegaard, the problem with ethical systems lies in their tendency to transform lived existence into an abstract schema. When ethical life is reduced to universal rules, the concrete individual disappears from view. The result is a form of reflection that speaks about ethics while avoiding the difficulty of actually living ethically. 

In Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard therefore insists that the central concern of ethics is not the formulation of universal principles but the existence of the individual who must act. The decisive issue is not the correctness of a moral theory but the seriousness with which an individual confronts the demands of existence. 

James expresses a closely related criticism in The Will to Believe. He rejects the idea that ethical philosophy can be constructed as a closed system derived from abstract principles. This is what he means when he writes that “there can be no such thing possible as an ethical philosophy dogmatically made up in advance” (WTB, p65). 

The remark is directed against philosophical attempts to determine moral truth independently of lived experience. James argues that moral philosophy must remain open because ethical life itself is not finished. New circumstances continually arise, and moral insight develops through the ongoing interaction of individuals within the world. Ethics therefore cannot be reduced to a completed theoretical system. 

The Individual and Moral Responsibility 

Both thinkers emphasise that ethical life must ultimately be carried by individuals rather than by abstract doctrines. 

For Kierkegaard, the ethical task arises from the individual’s confrontation with the demands of existence. One cannot evade responsibility by appealing to universal rules. The individual must decide how to act within the concrete situations that life presents. 

This emphasis on personal responsibility reflects Kierkegaard’s broader critique of speculative philosophy. Systems may describe ethical principles, but they cannot replace the individual who must actually choose. 

James articulates a similar point when he argues that ethical life emerges through the participation of individuals within a shared moral world, stating that “we all help to determine the content of ethical philosophy so far as we contribute to the race’s moral life” (WTB, p65). 

The significance of this claim lies in its rejection of the idea that moral truth exists independently of human action. Ethical values emerge through the interaction of individuals who attempt to reconcile competing demands and aspirations. Thus, moral philosophy must remain open-ended. 

Pluralism and Moral Conflict 

James develops this insight further by emphasising the plurality of moral claims that exist within human life. Individuals and communities often pursue different values that cannot be perfectly reconciled. 

In The Will to Believe, he describes the moral world as a field of competing demands. Ethical decision-making therefore involves the difficult task of negotiating between these demands. The presence of moral conflict means that no ethical system can provide a final solution. 

Instead, individuals must continually attempt to balance competing values in ways that preserve as much good as possible. James expresses this aspiration in the formulation that “the one unconditional commandment is that we should seek incessantly…to bring about the very largest total universe of good which we can see” (WTB, p73). 

The statement does not claim that the good can be perfectly realised. Instead, it emphasises the ongoing responsibility of individuals to pursue better possibilities within the limits of their knowledge. 

Kierkegaard and Ethical Existence 

Kierkegaard’s account of ethical life emphasises the seriousness of personal commitment. 

The ethical individual recognises that life cannot be reduced to abstract speculation. Decisions must be made, and those decisions shape the character of existence. Ethical life therefore requires continuity between reflection and action. The individual must live in accordance with the commitments he recognises as binding. 

This emphasis on commitment reflects Kierkegaard’s broader concern with inwardness. Ethical life is not merely a matter of external conformity to rules but of genuine dedication to what one recognises as right. Thus, ethical existence demands both responsibility and sincerity. 

Action and the Moral World 

When Kierkegaard and James are read together, ethical life appears less as a fixed structure than as an ongoing activity. 

James emphasises that moral progress arises through the cumulative efforts of individuals attempting to reconcile competing claims. Kierkegaard emphasises that the individual must confront the ethical demands of existence with seriousness and inward commitment. 

The two perspectives complement one another: 

1. James highlights the pluralistic character of the moral world, in which different values coexist and sometimes conflict. 

2. Kierkegaard highlights the existential responsibility of the individual, who must choose how to act within that world. 

Together they suggest that ethics cannot be reduced either to universal formulas or to arbitrary preference. Ethical life emerges through the interaction between individual commitment and the complex demands of human existence. 

PART SEVEN 

The Individual and the Social World 

The previous discussion has examined the formation of the self, the role of repetition and habit in shaping character, the significance of anxiety in opening the field of possibility, and the role of attention and inwardness in directing the course of life. The final question concerns the broader context within which these processes unfold. 

Human beings do not exist in isolation. Every individual life unfolds within a network of relationships, institutions, and traditions. The question therefore arises as to how the formation of the self relates to the moral world in which that self participates. 

Kierkegaard is frequently interpreted as a philosopher of radical individuality. His emphasis on inwardness and personal responsibility appears to place the individual in opposition to society. Yet such a reading overlooks the fact that Kierkegaard’s concern with the individual arises precisely because social life often encourages individuals to evade the responsibility of becoming themselves. 

The individual must therefore stand apart from the crowd in order to assume responsibility for his own existence. At the same time, this separation does not imply the abandonment of social life. Rather, it clarifies the conditions under which genuine ethical relations become possible. 

The Critique of the Crowd 

Kierkegaard repeatedly criticises what he calls the crowd: “The crowd is untruth.” (PV, p106). The crowd represents the tendency of individuals to dissolve their responsibility within collective opinion. It is similar to Heidegger’s concept of the They or theyness.  

The remark is not directed against community as such. Kierkegaard’s concern is that individuals often allow social conventions to determine their actions without reflection. In doing so they evade the task of becoming themselves. Ethical life therefore requires the individual to assume responsibility for his actions rather than relying on the authority of the majority. The critique of the crowd is thus a defence of personal accountability. 

James and the Moral Community 

William James approaches the relationship between individuals and the moral world from a different perspective. Where Kierkegaard emphasises the danger of social conformity, James emphasises the cooperative character of ethical life. 

In The Will to Believe, he argues that moral progress emerges through the interaction of individuals within a shared moral environment. As he writes: 

We all help to determine the content of ethical philosophy so far as we contribute to the race’s moral life. (WTB, p65) 

This statement suggests that moral values are not imposed from outside human life but develop through the ongoing activity of individuals attempting to realise the good within their circumstances. James therefore describes the moral universe as unfinished. Each generation contributes to the development of ethical understanding through its actions and decisions. 

Moral Pluralism 

James’s moral philosophy is grounded in the recognition that human life contains a plurality of competing values. Different individuals and communities pursue different ideals, and these ideals cannot always be reconciled without tension. He therefore describes the moral world as a field of negotiation rather than a completed order. Ethical progress occurs through the effort to reconcile competing demands in ways that preserve as much good as possible. 

This perspective rejects the idea that a single ethical system can provide definitive answers to every moral question. Instead, individuals must participate actively in the ongoing development of moral life. 

The Responsibility of the Individual 

When Kierkegaard and James are read together, a more nuanced picture of the relationship between the individual and the moral world emerges: 

1. Kierkegaard emphasises the necessity of personal responsibility. Ethical life requires the individual to confront the demands of existence with seriousness rather than hiding within the anonymity of the crowd. 

2. James accentuates the cooperative dimension of moral life. Ethical progress depends upon the contributions of individuals working within a shared world. 

These two insights complement one another: 

1. Without individual responsibility, social life degenerates into conformity and unreflective imitation. 

2. Without cooperative engagement, the individual risks becoming detached from the practical concerns of the moral world. 

Selfhood, Responsibility, and the Unfinished Moral World

The formation of the self takes place within a tension between individuality and participation. The individual therefore participates in a larger ethical process. 

1. Kierkegaard states that ethical life cannot be delegated to social institutions or philosophical systems. Each individual must assume responsibility for his own actions. 

2. James asserts that ethical life is never purely solitary. The consequences of individual actions extend into the lives of others and contribute to the ongoing development of the moral world. 

James’s pluralistic philosophy emphasises that the moral universe is not a finished structure but an evolving field of possibilities. Ethical life is therefore experimental. Individuals test different ways of living and discover through experience which arrangements of life best promote human flourishing. 

Kierkegaard’s emphasis on personal responsibility provides an important counterbalance to this experimentalism. Ethical decisions must be taken seriously, because they shape both the individual’s character and the lives of others. Thus, the moral world emerges through the interaction between individual commitment and collective life. 

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Appendix One 

Religiousness A and Religiousness B 

In Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard introduces a distinction between two fundamentally different forms of religiosity which he calls Religiousness A and Religiousness B. The distinction clarifies an important aspect of his authorship: the difference between a natural form of religious consciousness and the specifically Christian form of faith. 

Religiousness A refers to forms of religiosity that arise through reflection upon human existence itself. An individual may become aware of the limits of human life, the inevitability of suffering, and the dependence of existence upon a power greater than the self. Such reflection may produce humility, reverence, and ethical seriousness. Religion in this sense emerges from the individual’s attempt to come to terms with the conditions of existence. 

The individual recognises that life cannot be fully explained or controlled. In response, he may develop a religious orientation characterised by devotion, moral discipline, and contemplative awareness of the divine. This form of religiosity remains within the sphere of human reflection and ethical life. The individual seeks to relate himself appropriately to the divine, yet the relation remains grounded in the individual’s own efforts to understand and respond to the conditions of existence. 

Religiousness B introduces a radically different situation. In this form of religiosity the individual confronts the specifically Christian claim that God enters existence in the person of Christ. This claim cannot be resolved through philosophical reflection or ethical reasoning. It presents the individual with a paradox that exceeds the capacity of speculative thought. Faith therefore cannot arise simply from reflection upon the human condition. It requires an existential decision. 

Kierkegaard’s concern is not to demonstrate the truth of Christian doctrine through philosophical argument. Instead, he emphasises the transformation required of the individual who encounters this claim. The paradox demands that the individual decide how he will relate to it. Faith therefore becomes a matter of existential commitment rather than intellectual conclusion. 

The distinction between Religiousness A and Religiousness B highlights Kierkegaard’s broader concern with the relation between objective knowledge and subjective appropriation. Religiousness A remains within the sphere of reflection and ethical seriousness. Religiousness B requires a decision that reorganises the individual’s entire relation to existence. 

At this point the philosophy of William James offers a useful clarification. In The Varieties of Religious Experience, James proposes that religion should be understood primarily in terms of the experiences of individuals rather than the institutional forms of theology or doctrine. He writes: 

“Religion…shall mean for us the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.” (VRE, p31) 

James’s definition shifts attention away from the institutional structures of religion toward the personal experiences through which individuals relate themselves to what they regard as divine. Religion becomes a matter of lived experience rather than abstract theology. 

From this perspective, Religiousness A may be understood as the form of religion that arises naturally from reflection upon the conditions of human life. Individuals encounter suffering, moral conflict, and the limits of their own agency. These experiences generate a religious orientation that seeks meaning, humility, and moral discipline. 

Religiousness B, however, corresponds to what James describes elsewhere as the transformation of a divided personality through conversion. When an individual encounters a claim that demands existential commitment, the structure of life may be reorganised around that commitment. James describes such transformations as moments in which previously conflicting elements of the personality become unified around a new centre of meaning. The individual’s relation to existence is altered in a decisive way. 

Although Kierkegaard and James approach the subject from different directions, both recognise that religion becomes decisive only when it transforms the life of the individual. Religion cannot remain an object of detached contemplation. It must become a living relation that shapes the structure of existence. 

Kierkegaard expresses this transformation through the language of faith and paradox, while James describes it through the psychology of religious experience. In both cases the decisive point lies in the movement from reflection to existential commitment. 

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Sources and References 

~ (CUP) Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. Alastair Hannay (Cambridge University Press, 2009) by Soren Kierkegaard. 

~ (P) Pragmatism and Other Writings (Penguin Classics, 2000) by William James. 

~ (SUD) The Sickness Unto Death, trans. Alastair Hannay (Penguin Classics, 1989) by Soren Kierkegaard.
 
~ (PP) The Principles of Psychology: Volume One & Two (Dover Publications, 2000) by William James. 

~ (R) Repetition, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton University Press, 1983) by Soren Kierkegaard. 

~ (CA) The Concept of Anxiety, trans. Alastair Hannay (Penguin Classics, 1989) by Soren Kierkegaard. 

~ (WTB) The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (CreateSpace, 2014) by William James. 

~ (PV) The Point of View, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton University Press, 1998) by Soren Kierkegaard.
 
~ (VRE) The Varieties of Religious Experience (Penguin Classics, 1985) by William James.