Book Review: Clash of Extremes, Look Away!, and An Honorable Defeat

~ Clash of Extremes: The Economic Origins of the Civil War (Hill and Wang, 2009) by Marc Egnal.

~ Look Away!: A History of the Confederate States of America (Free Press, 2002) by William C. Davis.

~ An Honorable Defeat: The Last Days of the Confederate Government (Harcourt, 2001) by William C. Davis.

Marc Egnal’s Clash of Extremes, William C. Davis’s Look Away!, and Davis’ An Honorable Defeat can be read across the full life of the Confederacy. Egnal explains why slaveholders who had prospered within the Union came to regard Lincoln’s victory in 1860 as a threat to their political future. Davis follows what came next: the attempt to sustain an independent Confederate government through four years of war, then its final disintegration in the spring of 1865, when Lee and Johnston had surrendered but Jefferson Davis still hoped resistance might continue elsewhere. Read together, the three books shift the question from why the South seceded to whether the slaveholding order secession was meant to protect could sustain an independent country.

Egnal’s emphasis falls on the Great Lakes economy and the growing integration of the Northwest with the Northeast. Grain moved east through canals, lake ports and increasingly dense railway connections, while eastern capital and manufactured goods moved west. By 1860 the North produced about 90 per cent of American manufactured output and possessed roughly 70 per cent of the nation’s railway mileage. The South was not economically stagnant: cotton remained immensely profitable and deeply embedded in Atlantic commerce. But its wealth was concentrated in plantation agriculture and enslaved labour rather than in the more diversified commercial economy developing across the North and Northwest.

Kansas and Nebraska carried unusual political weight because each new free or slave state altered the balance of representation and the future reach of slavery. Egnal links that struggle to the rise of a Republican coalition drawing increasing strength from northern and western voters. Lincoln’s victory in 1860 demonstrated that the presidency could now be won without the Deep South. His administration lacked the constitutional power to abolish slavery immediately in the states where it already existed, but the election showed that slaveholding interests could no longer assume an effective veto over the Union’s political development.

The distinction between “economic interests” and slavery breaks down under Egnal’s own evidence. Slave property constituted a vast store of Southern wealth, while enslaved labour generated the crops on which plantation fortunes and much of the region’s credit depended. Restricting slavery’s expansion therefore threatened both the political reach of slaveholders and the future reproduction of their wealth. The economic argument does not displace slavery. Properly understood, it explains why the defence of slavery was inseparable from territorial expansion and control of federal power.

Confederate leaders in Look Away! had secured independence on paper; they now had to maintain armies without alienating the slaveholders, state governments, and white households on whom the war depended. Davis follows the disputes that arose as wartime mobilisation pressed more deeply into Southern society.

Dixie authorities requisitioned enslaved men for fortifications and transport while owners depended on them for agricultural production and private wealth. Requisition limited the master’s control over the labour of people he owned. The Confederacy had been created to give slavery greater security, yet its defence required military authorities to make claims on slave property that many owners resisted.

When the Confederate Congress introduced conscription in 1862, voluntary enlistment had proved insufficient to maintain the armies. Substitution and exemption provisions soon became contentious, particularly the legislation popularly known as the “Twenty Negro Law,” which exempted certain men responsible for plantations with twenty or more enslaved people. The charge of “a rich man’s war and a poor man’s fight” simplified Confederate class relations but named a real grievance. Davis shows that resentment did not necessarily mean disloyalty: men could remain committed to Confederate independence while believing that the burdens of war fell unevenly.

By 1863 those burdens were increasingly visible in civilian life. For example, the Richmond Bread Riot in April followed sharp rises in food prices and mounting shortages in the capital. Impressment deepened hostility when military agents took agricultural goods at official valuations from producers already coping with depreciating currency and disrupted markets. Davis connects these pressures to declining confidence at home. As shortages deepened, army supply increasingly came at the expense of civilian subsistence.”

Governor Joseph E. Brown of Georgia challenged Richmond on constitutional grounds. He opposed conscription and the suspension of habeas corpus as infringements on powers he believed remained with the states, bringing him into repeated conflict with Jefferson Davis. Brown did not reject Confederate independence; he disputed how far Richmond could reach in its name. His opposition exposed a problem built into the settlement of 1861: a continental war required coordination from the centre, while secession had been justified partly through an unusually strong defence of state autonomy.

Southern withdrawal from Congress allowed Republicans to enact much of the developmental programme Egnal traces before 1861. The Homestead Act opened western land, the Pacific Railway Act subsidised a transcontinental line, and the National Banking Acts reorganised finance. Measures long entangled in sectional conflict could now pass without Southern votes. The Union was not only suppressing secession; it was institutionalising a different programme of national development. Yet neither Egnal nor Davis supports a crude story of modern capitalism defeating an obsolete South. Cotton slavery remained profitable and deeply integrated into Atlantic commerce. Its weakness lay not in economic irrelevance but in the difficulty of directing slaveholding wealth and labour towards a prolonged national war.

An Honorable Defeat begins with Richmond’s evacuation on 2 April 1865 and follows Jefferson Davis and the surviving members of his cabinet south through Virginia, the Carolinas and Georgia. Lee surrendered at Appomattox on 9 April; Joseph E. Johnston’s army followed later that month. Davis nevertheless continued to consider whether organised resistance could be sustained farther south or transferred westward. Secretary of War John C. Breckinridge, Secretary of State Judah P. Benjamin, Postmaster General John H. Reagan and Secretary of the Navy Stephen R. Mallory remained among the principal figures around him. Their discussions show that Appomattox did not end the Confederacy in a single instant, even though the military basis for continued resistance was rapidly disappearing.

Secretary of War John C. Breckinridge increasingly differed from the president over what continued resistance could achieve. As an experienced field commander, he had to assess the consequences of Lee’s surrender, Johnston’s capitulation and the loss of any secure territorial base from which a conventional campaign might be renewed. Jefferson Davis continued to examine possibilities farther west; Breckinridge concluded that prolonging organised resistance was unlikely to change the outcome and risked further destruction. Their disagreement concerned not loyalty to the Confederacy but whether further fighting could still produce a plausible political result.

Davis handles these final weeks with considerable narrative control, but the concentration on the fugitive cabinet creates a problem of emphasis. Benjamin, Reagan, Mallory, Breckinridge and the president appear at close range as men interpreting military disaster and deciding what could still be done. That intimacy can make their predicament seem more tragic than culpable. Look Away! restores the institutional context the narrower narrative necessarily compresses. The “honour” in An Honorable Defeat can apply to particular decisions at the end, especially the refusal to prolong resistance once no credible military objective remained; it cannot be extended to the political project whose defeat they were managing.

Egnal explains why slaveholding elites feared the political future taking shape inside the Union; Davis follows what happened when they tried to escape that future by creating a country of their own. Economic transformation helps explain why sectional conflict became acute when it did, but not the full moral and ideological intensity of the crisis. Clash of Extremes is most persuasive when its economic analysis makes slavery more concrete rather than less central. The two Davis books carry that argument into war, where sustaining independence repeatedly disturbed the social order secession had been meant to secure.Look Away! is the more substantial of Davis’s two books because it shows the Confederacy while it was still functioning; An Honorable Defeat is narrower, but it records the point at which its leaders could no longer make organised resistance serve a realistic political end. Secession did not settle the sectional crisis by creating an independent slave republic; it recast the crisis as a test of whether the slave South could sustain independence in war. Davis’s answer, following Egnal’s, is not simply that the North possessed more men and material. The Confederacy also struggled to mobilise the society it had been created to preserve.

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